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decedent's estate because the " 'decedent strayed materially from the
plan's payment provisions' "- and thus "removed them from the statutory category of 'payment receivable . . . under a contract pur-chased by an employees' trust . . .[as] part of a pension ...
plan."46 As one concurring opinion stated, the overly broad language
employed by the majority contravened the intent of Congress to protect and facilitate the establishment of annuities by employers for
their employees."
However, the most important ramification of Silverman is that
the provisions of a qualified plan must be closely followed to ensure
that contracts issued and payments rendered remain excludable as
part of a qualified plan. If a contract or method of payment fails to
conform with the qualified plan, then the amounts attributable to the
contracts or the payments owed are subject to taxation in the deceased participant's estate.

IV.

POWERS OF APPOINTMENT UNDER § 2041
Under § 2041 of the Code,' a decedent's possession at his death of

15CCH [1974 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. 32,449, at 2337 (concurring opinion, J. Tannenwald).
"Id. (concurring opinion, J. Hall).
" Id.
In stating that too strict a reading of the provisions of § 2039 contravenes
the intent of Congress to treat annuities leniently in the tax area, Judge Hall refers to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Id. n.1. The Act was signed
into law by President Ford on September 2, 1974 as Public Law 93-406. P-H 1974 FED.
TAXES 60,417, at 60,669 (Sept. 5, 1974). Congress stated a dual policy behind the Act
intending to provide full disclosure and reporting to retirement plan participants
and to establish minimum standards of responsibility and soundness in regard to
retirement plans. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1000(b) and (c) (Supp. 1974). Reference was specifically made to the loss of anticipated benefits by employees with many years of employment apparently precipitated by the absence of full disclosure and the absence of
minimum standards. Id. at § 1001(a). To help alleviate some of these problems Congress established a declaratory judgment section in the laws governing the Tax Court
to allow parties to seek review of administrative decisions on the initial or continuing
qualification of pension plans of the type in § 2039(c). 29 U.S.C.A. § 7476 (Supp. 1975).
Also, because of the belief that the Internal Revenue Service is primarily concerned
with the collection of revenues without giving sufficient consideration to the purposes
for which certain employees benefit plans are exempt, Congress established the "Office
of Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations" headed by an Assistance Commissioner, which is designed to be better able to meet and understand the purposes and
requirements of exempt plans and organizations. 29 U.S.C.A. § 7802 (Supp. 1975); see
S. REP. No. 93-383, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 609 (Pension Reform Act, 1974).
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 2041.
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a power of appointment 2 may render the property affected by the
power subject to federal estate taxation. The increasing use of the
power of appointment as a method of disposition is attributed to its
efficiency, 3 flexibility, and favorable tax treatment.' Although the
power of appointment appears to be a simple device, its pervasive
and varied usage often reveals hidden difficulties particularly with
regard to estate taxation.5
Basically, only general powers of appointment are taxed under the
Code.' A general power of appointment is defined as being a power
by which the holder, the donee,*can appoint the property subject to
the power for the benefit of himself, his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of his estate.7 One exception to the inclusion in the donee's
taxable estate of property subject to a general power of appointment
arises when the donee's power is limited by an "ascertainable standard."' However, the term "ascertainable standard" has often been
the subject of litigation.' Among the cases concerning § 2041 that
were decided in 197410 was First Virginia Bank v. United States," a
I A succinct definition of "power of appointment" is the "power to dispose of
property which the holder of the power does not own." C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER, AND
J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 12.1, at 298 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as C. LOWNDES].
3 See 1 H. HARRIS, HANDLING FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 161 (J. Rasch rev.
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as H. HARRIS].
I J. TRACHTMAN, ESTATE PLANNING 201 (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as J.
TRACHTMAN].
'

See id.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§

2041(a)(1)(2).

Id. at § 2041(b)(1) Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(1) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6581,
26 F.R. 11861 (1961). See C. LOWNDES, supra note 2, § 12.5, at 207; J. DUKEMINIER AND
7

S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 232-33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as J.
DUKEMINIER]; J. TRACHTMAN, supra note 4, at 203-05; 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 19.07 (1959, Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as J.
MERTENS].
I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b)(1)(A). A sufficient limitation on the power to
consume, invade, or appropriate property for the benefit of the decedent exists when
the ascertainable standard is related to the health, education, support or maintenance
of the decedent. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) (1958). See C. LOWNDES, supra note
2, § 12.6, at 311. H. HARRIS, supra note 3, at § 166; J. MERTENS, supra note 7, at §

19.13; J. DUKEMINIER, supra note 7.
See C. LowNDES, supra note 2, § 12.6, at 311 n.71 for a listing of cases where the
limitation failed to meet the requisite standard for exclusion of the property from the
decedent's taxable estate.
," Other 1974 decisions concerning § 2401 in addition to those in textual discussion, are Carson v. Commissioner, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1434 (1974); Stewart v.
United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. T 12,998, at 8439 (M.D. Fla 1974); Also the I.R.S.
handed down a revenue ruling, CUM. BULL. REV. RuE. 492, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No.
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Fourth Circuit decision discussing the parameters of ascertainable
standards.
In First VirginiaBank, the decedent's husband gave her the right
during her lifetime, in regard to stocks and other holdings in a corporation that he left to her in his will, "to dispose, sell, trade or use said
holdings. . . for her comfort and care as she may see fit."12 The issue
before the court centered upon the words "comfort and care" in the
phrase creating the power of appointment. The government contended that the decedent possessed a general power of appointment
at her death because she could sell or spend the proceeds for reasons
not related to her health, support, or maintenanee. 1 Therefore, the
value of the stock, the government argued, should be included in her
estate under § 2041(a)(2).
The administrator of the decedent's estate advanced two arguments in an attempt to refute the government's contention. The first
was that the decedent's right to consume the property for her comfort
41, at 13, stating the opinion that a wife, not provided for in her husband's will, who
died during the six month election period without making an election to take against
her husband's will did not possess a general power of appointment. Therefore the value
of property subject to an election was excluded from her gross estate.
Both Carson and Stewart are pre-1942 power of appointment decisions and such
powers are usually dealt with by § 2041(a)(1). In Carson, the decedent was deemed to
possess only a "special power of appointment" because his control over the property
was limited to disposing of the property only to his surviving spouse and children. 33
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1434, 1438 (1974). A special power of appointment is not technically an exception to a general power of appointment and to taxation under § 2041.
Rather, a special power of appointment is a power to appoint property to a limited class
of persons who are not within the four categories defined as being within the scope of
a general power of appointment-the power to dispose of property to the donee himself,
his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate. Since the surviving spouse and
children were not within any of the four categories, the power was not a basis for
inclusion of the property subject thereto. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(1)(a) (1958), as
amended, T.D. 6581, 26 F.R. 11861 (1961); see H. HARRIS, supra note 3, at § 165;
DUKEMINIER,

supra note 7 at 233.

In Stewart the decedent was given a testamentary general power of appointment
over property that could be exercised "any law, custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding." 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,988, at 84,394-94. The decedent was deemed
to have exercised the power, without mentioning the power specifically, in the residuary clause of his will regardless of intent, in the absence of renunciation of an
expressed intent, not to exercise the power. Id. at 84,396. For discussion on pre-October
21, 1942 powers of appointment see C. LOWNDS, supra note 2, at § 12.10; H. HARRIS,
supra note 3, at § 167; J. MERTENS, supra note 7, at § 19.07.
" 490 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1974).
12 Id.

at 533.

'3 See note 8 supra concerning the exception to the existence of a general power

of appointment when the decedent's power is limited by an ascertainable standard.
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and care was limited by state law to the standard of living to which
she was accustomed. According to the administrator, the decedent's
standard of living was frugal and countenanced expenditures only for
health, support, or maintenance. The second argument offered by the
administrator was that state law would give effect to the inference
that decedent's husband intended for the decedent to use the holdings for her support only after other resources were depleted. The
implication of the second argument appeared to be that if the decedent had failed to consume her other property, then the power of
appointment could not have been exercised and the property subject
to the power could not therefore be taxed in decedent's estate."
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the well established principle
that a decedefit's power to control property is defined by state law.
However, concomitant with this principle of state law determination
is the principle that federal law determines whether the power is
subject to federal taxation. 5 Under these accepted principles, the
court, therefore, initially had to determine the nature of the dispository power created by decedent's husband for the decedent according
to Virginia law.
The court stated that under Virginia law the qualifying words
"comfort and care" did not limit the full power of disposition that
decedent possessed over the stocks. Reference was made to both statutory" and case17 law to support the position that the words of limi490 F.2d at 534.
Id. In Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940), the Supreme Court stated:
State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue
acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed. Our
duty is to ascertain the meaning of the words used to specify the thing
taxed. If it is found. . . that an interest or right created by local law
was the object intended to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no
matter what name is given to the interest or right by state law.
Id. at 80-81. Treasury Regulation § 20.2041-1(b)(1) embodies this concept of substance
over form in regard to powers of appointment and state law. See Lehman v. United
States, 448 F.2d 1318, 1319 (5th Cir. 1971).
" The court referred to Va. Code § 55-7 (1969) which prevented the remainder of
a fee simple in the donee's legatees from being destroyed by the absolute power of
appointment given to the done. The court was careful to point out that the statute did
not restrict the life tenant's power of disposition. 490 F.2d at 534 & n.61; see Rawlings
v. Briscoe, 214 Va. 44, 47, 197 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1973)..
"7The case relied upon by the court was Rawlings v. Briscoe, 214 Va. 44, 197 S.E.
2d 211 (1973). 490 F.2d at 535. In Rawlings, the decedent as life tenant was authorized
to sell and use any part of the property that "may be necessary for her care and maintenance." The life tenant gave a portion of the property to her grandchild and this gift
was challenged on the basis that the life tenant was empowered only to sell and use
the property for her own care and maintenance. The Virginia Supreme Court stated
"
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tation merely showed the donor's motive for giving the decedent a
power of appointment. The words were not to be construed as forming
an ascertainable standard relating to decedent's health, support or
maintenance. 8 The court implied that in Virginia and other states
which lack limitations on powers of appointment, it is necessary to
use the limiting words found in § 2041(b) (1) (a) 9 or the treasury regulations" to avoid the power being classified as a general power of
appointment. The absence of any limitations on the powers over the
property under state law and of any limiting terms as set forth in the
federal statute or regulations refuted the administrator's contention
in First Virginia Bank that an adequate limitation existed.2
The Fourth Circuit also summarily disposed of the administrator's second contention that state law implicitly required the decedent to deplete her other resources before selling the stock. The court
pointed to a treasury regulation which stated that "[iun determining
whether a power is limited by an ascertainable standard, it is immaterial whether the beneficiary is required to exhaust his other income
before the power can be exercised." 2 Therefore, the court concluded
that because of the absence of an ascertainable standard the property
was includable in decedent's gross estate for taxation purposes.?
that the words "care and maintenance" had to be construed consistently with past
interpretations that such words merely evidenced the donor's motive. See Mowery v.
Coffman, 185 Va. 491, 494, 39 S.E.2d 285, 286-87 (1946); Davis v. Kendall, 130 Va.
175, 195-96, 107 S.E. 751, 757 (1921); Conrad v. Conrad's Ex'r, 123 Va. 711, 716-17,
97 S.E. 336, 338 (1918).
10 490 F.2d at 535.
" See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
Besides health, education, support, and maintenance, the terms found in §
2041(b)(1)(A), the regulations provide some examples of words of limitation meeting
the requisite standard: "'support in reasonable comfort,' 'maintenance in health and
reasonable comfort,' 'support in his accustomed manner of living.' 'education, including college and professional education,' 'health,' and 'medical, dental, hospital and
nursing expenses and expenses of invalidism.'" Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1-(c)(2) (1958),
as amended, T.D. 6581, 26 F.R. 11861 (1961).
21 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
2 490 F.2d at 535 n.7; Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c) (2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6581,
26 F.R. 11861 (1961).
2 490 F.2d at 535. There is further support for the decision reached by the court
in the fact that the decedent was the spouse of the creator of the power of appointment,
and therefore the most natural object of the creator's bounty. It has been stated that
where the decedent appears to be the main object of the testator's (decedent's husband
in this case) bounty, that the power to invade the property should be given its broadest
meaning. Miller v. United States, 387 F.2d 866, 868 (3d Cir. 1968); Strite v. McGinnes,
215 F. Supp. 513, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1963), afj'd, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 836, rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 910 (1964). A power of appointment given its
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The position taken by the Fourth Circuit in First Virginia Bank
represents adherence to the doctrine of strict interpretation of terms
employed to limit general powers of appointment by an ascertainable
standard. 4 However, the courts are not always at a loss to find an
ascertainable standard despite the absence of the exact terms employed by § 2041(b)(1)(A) and the treasury regulations.2 An example
of the court finding an ascertainable standard despite a failure to
conform exactly with statutory and regulatory provisions is found in
another 1974 decision, Tucker v. United States. 6
In Tucker, a power of appointment in the trustee-decedent, who
was also the beneficiary, was limited by the terms "reasonable care,
comfort and support." Despite nonconformity with the terms promulgated under § 2041(b)(1)(A) or under the treasury regulations, 7 the
district court found the power of appointment to be limited by an
ascertainable standard. The court noted that a state court reviewing
an invasion of the trust corpus would not find it difficult to ascertain
.a standard to limit the trustee's discretion. Therefore, the decedent
was not deemed to have held a general power of appointment thereby
excluding the property subject to the power from decedent's estate.2
The difference between the holdings in First Virginia Bank and
Tucker might be reconciled on two bases. First, the decedent in
Tucker was a trustee of the property subject to the power of appointment, while the decedent in First Virginia Bank was not a trustee.
Under many state statutes the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee
prohibit use or consumption of a trust's income or corpus for the
trustee's own benefit. This factor alone would seem to limit severely
the exercise of a power of appointment for the trustee's benefit. Howbroadest meaning in First Virginia Bank would further substantiate the court's belief
that the term "comfort and care" represented a motive rather than a limitation.
24 See Miller v. United States, 387 F.2d 866, 868 (3d Cir. 1968); Strite v.
McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234, 240 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836, rehearing denied,
379 U.S. 910 (1964); Stafford v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 132, 134 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
25 See, e.g., Pittsfield Nat'l Bank v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 851,853 (D. Mass.
1960); note 20 supra.
2' 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,026 at 85,838 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
27 In Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) (1958), the examples of ascertainable standards
include "support in reasonable comfort" which is closely analogous to the standard in
Tucker.
1174-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (P6 13,026, at 8859-81).
2 See G.G. BOGERT AND G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TusTEEs § 1.9 (2d ed. 1965); 2
A. Scor, THE LAW OF TRusTs § 170.23 (3d ed. 1967). Also, the Fourth Circuit itself
in First Virginia Bank appeared to recognize the significant difference between powers
of appointment in the hands of a trustee and a non-trustee. See 490 F.2d at 535 in
regard to the court's reference to Hughes v. Williams, 99 Va. 312, 38 S.E. 138 (1901).
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ever, in addition to the fact that the decedent was a trustee, the
decedent's right of invasion in Tucker was limited by a standard of
"reasonableness" in regard to the terms "care, comfort and support."
This requirement of reasonableness was absent in the terms of the
power of appointment created in the decedent in FirstVirginia Bank.
The nonexistence of this added limitation on the exercise of the power
of appointment could serve to justify the decision in First Virginia
Bank." Neither Tucker nor First Virginia Bank decided, however,
whether the fact that the holder of the power of appointment, solely
because he is a trustee, will suffice to place restrictions on the power
tantamount to an ascertainable standard.
In Maytag v. United States,3' a recent Tenth Circuit decision, the
court considered whether the limitations on a trustee, solely because
of his fiduciary responsibilities, were sufficient to constitute an ascertainable standard. The decedent's father created two irrevocable
trusts with a bank as the trustee andtwo individuals as co-trustees.
The decedent, who was the principal beneficiary of the trusts, was to
become a co-trustee upon reaching majority pursuant to the trust's
terms. The co-trustees were given supreme power over the trusts with
the trustee bank relieved of all responsibility when acting in accord
with the directions of the co-trustees. Both trusts could be terminated when all the trustees agreed that the trust should be terminated and the proceeds given to the beneficiary. The power to terminate remained unexercised at the 32death of the decedent who had
reached majority prior to his death.
The Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed the relevance of the nonexercise of the power by decedent3 and the fact that decedent shared
the power with non-adverse trustees.Y A general power of appoint30See note 27 supra where it is shown that the term "reasonable" is included in a
standard of limitation similar to that in Tucker.
3' 493 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1974).
312
Id. at 996-97. If the decedent had died before reaching majority, then apparently
there would be little question that the value of the trusts would not be includable in
decedent's estate for taxation purposes. It is stated that if the power to appoint property is contingent upon an occurrence, other than the giving of notice or the passing of
a stated time period after the exercise of the power for the exercise to be effective,
which has not taken place before decedent's death, then the power does not exist at
decedent's death. Therefore the property contingently subject to the power is not
taxable to decedent's estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b) (1958); C. LowNDEs, supranote
1, § 12.11, at 317.
- Non-exercise of a general power of appointment fails to prevent taxation of the
property subject to the power to the holder's estate. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954 §
2041(a)(2); see Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1156, 1158 (3d Cir. 1969).
3' The Internal Revenue Code requires, in regard to post-October 21, 1942 powers
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ment existed, the court in Maytag stated, unless the decedent under
state law" was proscribed from participation in any decision as cotrustee to allow him to distribute the property to himself.
The court found that unde applicable Colorado case law the intent
of the settlor prevailed as to the construction and interpretation of a
trust unless in violation of public policy or statutory provisions." The
court cited the extensive povers given the decedent by the settlor as
well as the specific provision that the decedent could not be removed
as a co-trustee as indications of the intent of the settlor not to restrict
the decedent's power by an ascertainable standard. Furthermore, no
cases existed under Colorado law which stood for the proposition that
a beneficiary of a trust could not participate as a trustee in any
decision to distribute trust proceeds to himself. 7
The executor of the decedent's estate made reference to cases from
New York to support the contention that Colorado should adopt the
rule that "absent a very clear and specific expression of intent to the
contrary by a settlor" the decedent as trustee could not have participated in any decision to distribute trust proceeds to himself., The
court, however, stated that New York had a statute prohibiting beneficiaries from participating as trustees in decisions to benefit themselves. Therefore, the court reasoned that in the absence of a specific
prohibition in state law, as in New York, giving rise to a restriction
on the decedent's power over the property, the trustee is free to hold
a general power of appointment unless either an ascertainable standard, as set forth in the federal statutes and regulations, or an adverse
party, as co-holder of the power, exists. The absence of such a showing in Maytag precipitated the inclusion of the trusts' proceeds subject to the power in the decedent's estate for taxation purposes." The
Tenth Circuit's decision appears to represent the traditional view on
of appointment, that in order for the power of appointment not to be considered as a
general power of appointment that the co-holders of the power have "a substantial
interest in the property, subject to the power, which is adverse to the exercise of the
power in favor of the decedent ...
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b)(1)(C)(ii). The
other trustees in Maytag had no such substantial adverse interest. If the power of
appointment had been created on or before October 21, 1942, the mere existence of the
co-holders of the power would have removed the general power of appointment classification. Id. § 2041 (b)(1)(B).
" See note 15 and accompanying text supra as to the relationship between state
and federal law in estate taxation cases.
"' 493 F.2d at 998. See Ketcham v. International Trust Co., 117 Colo. 559, 192 P.2d
426, 427 (1948).
493 F.2d at 998.
3' See 493 F.2d at 999 & n.6.
" 493 F.2d at 999-1000.

